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After the distress hit the financial system in 
2008, at the London Summit in April 2009, 
the G20 leaders all agreed that the current 
system in the whole world is vulnerable. 
Regulators have started taking steps to 
overcome the discrepancies. The biggest 
concern related to the regulatory framework 
was that it was incapable of preventing 
imbalances and spillover of distress among 
entities, or even countries. As a result, over 
the past decade, structural changes were 
applied in the financial system. Recent 
regulatory initiatives aim to enforce the 
system by proposing important prudential 
requirements and improved protection rules. 
Central counterparties (CCP) were one of 
the fields requiring robust improvement. 
Besides the implementation of new regulatory 
frameworks, CCPs gained high importance 
in the financial world. Over the last years, 
this area became the dominant institution 
in the “non-banking” field. The G20 leaders 
recognized the benefits in risk management 
offered by CCPs, so they agreed in 2009 
that standardized over-the-counter derivative 
transactions should be centrally cleared 
(G20, 2009). The aforementioned prudential 
requirements were for CCPs themselves also 
established to strengthen their resilience to 
promote systematic stability. Since the crisis, 
global standards have been implemented to E-mail address: melinda.szodorai@gmail.com
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ensure resilience and are continually being 
adjusted and improved.
DIsCUssIon
The general mechanism of  a CCP
The CCP becomes a “central” party between 
traders, becoming a buyer to the seller, and a 
seller to the buyer, a process called novation. The 
two parties are, therefore, no longer exposed 
to each other, but only to the CCP, which 
provides insurance against bilateral default 
risk (Biais et al., 2012). The benefits CCPs 
give is that the CCP takes market participants’ 
trading exposures onto its balance sheet, 
relieving the counterparties of multilateral 
risk exposures. They reduce counterparty 
risks among market participants, and the 
multilateral netting gives further benefits to the 
members. [(Lopez and Saeidinezhad (2017), 
Cont and Kokholm (2014)]. As discussed by 
Elliot (2013), CCPs became “too important to 
fail” and “too interconnected to fail” so they can 
be considered as the backbone of the financial 
system. This feature of CCPs is also regarded 
as a potential source of risk (Markose et al., 
2012; Duffie and Zhu 2011).
Risks of  CCPs
The default of a clearing member is typically 
the CCP’s primary source of uncertainty when 
one or more clearing member fails to meet 
their obligations. In this case, the CCP needs 
to take measures to re-establish a matched 
book (Plata, 2017). In typical conditions, 
this is achieved through the auction of the 
open positions amongst the non-defaulting 
clearing members (Wendt, 2015). Failing to 
return to a matched book would expose the 
whole system to heightened risk, and it would 
have even worse effects in stressed conditions, 
leading to the usage of additional resources, 
such as the contributions of the default fund 
from non-faulty members (Priem, 2017). The 
most vulnerable points, including points by 
which a CCP could trigger or amplify systemic 
risk, is liquidity risk creation, the transmission 
of stress, risk shifting, wring-time risk, and 
information and incentive issues (Murphy 
2017; Pirrong, 2014; Hughes and Manning 
2015).
A CCP’s leading role and purpose are to 
centralize counterparty risk management in the 
financial markets that operate (Pirrong, 2014). 
By analyzing the risks and the systematic 
importance of the CCPs, many – i.e., Cox 
and Steigerwald (2017), Hughes and Manning 
(2015), Faruqui et al. (2018) draw similarities 
with banks. However, there is a resemblance 
between the two types of financial institutions; 
it is crucial to emphasize that CCPs are not 
banks. CCPs are acting as risk managers – 
therefore subject to credit and liquidity risk 
of clearing members default - while banks are 
risk-takers. Compared to the functioning of 
banks, the “specialties” of CCPs is presented 
by Berlinger et al. (2016), this determines 
their risk management system. CCPs can be 
called unique in the meaning that they are 
not payment systems, depositories, insurance 
companies or exchange platforms, nor trading 
platforms, although they have characteristics 
that be similar to insurance because of their 
“guarantee mechanism.” This guarantee 
mechanism is the reason why the inclusion of 
a clearinghouse may lead to seeing the CCP as 
an insurer, rather than a principal to cleared 
trades: “While both serve an intermediary 
function, the similarity ends there” (Cox and 
Steigerwald, 2017).
The positive side of the risk-reducing 
mechanism is that each trade cleared contributes 
to multilateral netting of exposures, thereby 
reducing the amount of risk to be managed 
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relative to a non-centrally cleared ones (Duffie 
and Zhu 2011). Consequently, CCPs clear 
more trades and market processes concentrate 
around it, increasing its importance and 
reliance as well, so a potential spillover in 
the system should be managed correctly and 
in time. The risks amplify because the CCP 
will be unable to accomplish its primary role 
and cannot absorb the shock, leading to its 
materialization of the distress. Due to the 
liquidity shortage, it will result in transmitting 
the damages to the broader system.
Current regulatory and market requirements 
are leading CCPs to implement sophisticated 
practices to manage the default of one or 
more clearing members. Nevertheless, the 
management of non-default losses (NDLs) is 
also essential from the resilience perspective. 
The PFMI establishes standards for the 
management of NDLs, with specific principles 
for legal, business, investment, custody 
and, operational risks. In the current paper, 
NDLs are not discussed in detail; however, 
regarding resolution and recovery planning, 
this topic will be covered minimally. Lewis 
and McPartland (2017) highlight that a 
CCP’s choices regarding the management of 
NDLs can influence the cost of clearing and 
members’ trading activities and, ultimately, a 
shift in their incentives.
Béres (2018) also points out the undeniable 
positive effect of CCPs. He analyzes both 
central securities depositories and central 
counterparties, and he highlights that the two 
infrastructures can determine the efficiency of 
the financial and capital markets by having 
an indirect effect on the performance of the 
whole economy. 
The primary goal is to reduce risk and 
also to enforce the resilience of the financial 
system by avoiding burdening the market 
participants. Central counterparties mitigate 
counterparty risk and are prepared to 
withstand under “extreme but plausible 
market conditions.” However, CCPs are no 
panacea, as if distress hits the financial system, 
CCPs are not an exception of harsh aftermath. 
While CCPs provide protection against 
idiosyncratic counterparty risk and serve as 
safeguards for the system as a whole, they 
offer no essential protection against aggregate 
risk and may even encourage risk-shifting 
(Biais et al., 2016). The default of a CCP, 
however, becomes a systemic risk, triggering 
the collapse, or at least weakening resilience 
(Duffie et al., 2015). Since 1973 there were 
three significant events of this type, and some 
near fails as well (Kiff, 2014). These events 
happened in the commodity markets, mostly 
because of speculative trades failing because of 
unexpected weather conditions. Transparency 
and the risk management tools enhanced since 
but were never tested before. Their efficiency 
remains uncertain.
Overview of  the regulatory  
background
The potential threats mentioned can be 
managed by proper risk management tools, 
and let us not forget that regulators aim 
to prevent the development of inadequate 
managing systems by offering a prudent 
and rigorous legislative background. The 
regulation for CCPs in the European Union 
was published in 2012. The regulation is 
called European Market Infrastructures 
Regulation, abbreviated as EMIR. Regulatory 
technical standards supplement the text of 
EMIR; these are the so-called “technical 
details.” A total of 9 Regulatory Technical 
Standards are supplementing the EMIR, while 
the 3 Implementing Regulations assist the 
implementation of the law.
Additionally, they are complemented by 
guidelines helping the interpretation of the 
law and its application. Moreover, Q&A 
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(questions and answers) are also issued 
regularly by ESMA (European Securities and 
Markets Authority). In 2012, the Financial 
Infrastructure Recommendations were 
consolidated, and a framework for their 
evaluation was created –under the name 
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
(PFMI). The recommendations contained in 
the PFMI were later supplemented by further 
proposals aimed at the restoration, stability, 
and transparency of CCPs. The PFMI and the 
EMIR, although they serve the same purpose 
- the balance of the financial system – show 
fundamental differences. The main difference 
between the two is that EMIR regulates in more 
detail. However, the PFMI Recommendations 
have evolved since 2012 but are not fully 
covered by EMIR. Váradi (2018) points out 
a few reasons why the gap between PFMI and 
EMIR has widened in recent years. 
To assure the proper application of the 
imposed framework, ESMA, in cooperation 
with National Competent Authorities, 
oversees the activity of CCPs under their 
jurisdiction. Local authorities have the power 
to require even more stringent rules. The 
Central Bank of Hungary supervises Hungary’s 
only CCP, KELER CCP. As the supervisory 
function, the Central Bank of Hungary 
shall carry out official procedures within 
the scope of its responsibilities, including 
authorization processes, official controls, and 
sanctions for non-compliance. The Capital 
Market Act and EMIR simultaneously 
regulate the clearing activities performed by 
KELER CCP, and the CCP has to ensure 
compliance continuously. The CCP is part 
of the payment system, so besides the Capital 
Market Act, additional decrees provide the 
infrastructure’s technical operation, general 
safety, and business continuity (MNB, 2009a). 
Regarding transparency, guarantee rules, 
risk management, collateral management, 
principles of determination of fees, the Central 
Bank of Hungary also imposes regulations to 
adhere to (MNB, 2009b). The whole payment 
system is subject to an annual analysis by the 
Central Bank of Hungary (MNB, 2019). 
The rules and the arrangements are the 
results of a carefully thought out process, 
incorporating the experience for over more 
than a century regarding central counterparty 
clearing on a global basis. In the following, 
I will present a general view regarding the 
financial resources available for CCPs to 
handle defaults, focusing on the capital of the 
CCP included in the system. 
DEFAUlT wATErFAll
The default waterfall is the financial basis of the 
member default mechanism. It shall be high 
enough to survive and to protect the system 
from distress. A so-called Cover 2 rule is set, 
meaning that the default waterfall should be 
high enough to cover the losses of its top two 
clearing members it has exposure to.  Both 
clearing members and stakeholders expect the 
viability of the CCP. The capital inclusion is 
the system is from both sides arises; therefore, 
the stakes are high for everybody. In this paper, 
the own funds provided by the CCP are in 
the main focus, while the components of the 
default fund are subject to a short presentation.
Initial margin  
and default fund contribution 
Regulations require using the available 
balances in a preordered sequence. Margins 
are the first layer of financial resources, which 
the CCP can only apply to cover losses of 
the defaulting member. Margins provided by 
the non-defaulting members cannot be used 
during the exhaustion of the default waterfall. 
The primary goal of the margins is to cover 
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potential market losses in the clearing members’ 
positions in normal market conditions. (EMIR, 
Article 41 and Chapter VI). Procyclicality is an 
additional component that must be taken into 
consideration. The margining methodology 
used by the Hungarian CCP is the one 
proposed by Váradi and Béli (2017), fully 
complying with the regulatory requirements.
Margins are then followed by the second 
type of assets, the default fund contribution 
(EMIR Article 48). The use of the default fund 
contributions occurs during stressful conditions. 
Regulators require CCPs to implement an 
internal policy framework for defining the 
types of “extreme but plausible” market 
conditions. Besides covering losses to extreme 
market conditions, at this level appears a cross-
guarantee or mutualization of loss between 
clearing members. Non-faulty members’ 
contributions can be subject to exhaustion if 
needed, but before this, the third layer will be 
used. This is the funds of the CCPs, known as 
the skin-in-the-game (SITG). 
Skin-in-the-game 
According to Article 35 of EMIR, CCPs must 
provide a considerable fraction of their equity 
as skin-in-the-game in the default waterfall 
system. The level is set to 25%. There are two 
tranches of SITG’s. The junior trench is the 
25% set by the regulator, which is used before 
reaching out to the non-faulty members’ default 
fund contributions. With this commitment, 
the CCP’s management and shareholders too 
bear the consequences if it is inescapable to 
apply the CCP’s capital buffer (Cont, 2015). 
Researchers [Cont (2015), Murphy (2017), 
and McPartland and Lewis (2017)] point out 
that in case the waterfall is exhausted and 
proven to be inadequate, before entering the 
recovery phase, there should be another SITG, 
the so-called senior trench. It is not mandatory, 
but CCPs may use it to avoid triggering 
more drastic tools of recovery. They suggest 
that regulators are the ones who can answer 
by asking “what level of skin-in-the-game 
would be sufficient to generate the amount of 
clearing they consider necessary, were market 
participants free to choose whether or not 
to clear any particular trade.” Cox (2015) 
suggests that supervising authorities “should 
have the responsibility to ensure that a sufficiently 
objective and balanced decision is reached.” 
While the junior trench is serving as “an 
auction inducement and a nuisance-avoidance 
deductible,” the senior trance has the “ability 
to replenish the junior (…) to maintain public 
confidence.”
Even though the CCP takes its own skin in 
the game, this capital shall not be a primary 
resource for loss absorption, otherwise, it 
would massively alter the incentives of the 
market participant.  Cox and Steigerwald 
(2017) explain how a significant amount of 
CCP capital can dilute the mutualized risk 
characteristic of the CCP, disincentivizing 
members to support the necessary process 
of liquidating a failed member’s positions, 
affecting the business model of the CCP. 
Moreover, the amount of SITG can be 
harmful if its scale does not fit the risk profile 
of the CCP by being too high or too low. 
According to Murphy (2017), if a CCP’s 
capital contribution to the waterfall is too 
low, clearing members would engage high risk 
with the clearing activity, leading them to seek 
trades not subject to clearing. In case the SITG 
is high, an issue of moral hazard may arise. 
DEbATE AGAInsT hIGh  
skIn-In-ThE-GAmE
High SITG has an uncertain impact on 
clearing activity. Collateral is costly, and a 
higher level of capital requirement means 
 FOCUS – Economic/financial risks and sustainability 
Public Finance Quarterly  2020/4 477
that traders must bear higher collateral costs, 
but an adequately capitalized CCP is more 
resilient, giving higher certainty for surviving 
traders, and it imposes lower or nil loss for 
them. (CPMI-IOSCO, 2012). 
Regulators impose strict rules for 
CCPs aiming for loss-absorption and loss-
mutualization. Let us not forget, this layer 
also motivates the CCP to apply proper risk 
management to protect the system it clears. 
Including their own financial resources 
can discipline the CCP to avoid lax risk 
management and to prevent the pile-up of 
risky positions without proper collateral 
security. Transparent processes and policies can 
only achieve a resilient and resistant system.
CCP experts have the exact opposite 
opinion regarding the amount of SITG. CME 
highlights that “Skin in the game doesn’t protect 
end client.” and points out that concentration 
risk has a higher threat. It can encourage moral 
hazard among the clearing members because 
CCPs contribute more substantial financial 
resources to the default fund. One way to 
deal with concentration risk is to penalize 
the clearing member causing it. The party 
concerned would pay additional collaterals, so 
in case of a default, those funds are available 
to resolve the issues it generated.  (Surprise, 
2015). Otherwise, the end clients would 
also suffer from the exhaustion of the CCP’s 
financial resources. In the long run, this would 
benefit neither the CCP nor the end clients, 
especially if the default events accumulate. 
The protection of the end client, in the CME’s 
point of view, is not assured by the investments 
in the guarantee fund by the CCP. It can “be 
used to close shortfalls in client account, thereby 
protecting non-defaulting end clients.” (Suprise, 
2015). Experts explain their standpoint 
against high skin-in-the-game proportion 
with the high cost of capital and the incentives 
of clearing members they are willing to take. 
However, they agree on the necessity of the 
junior tranche because it indicates the first line 
of defense, and therefore is a strong incentive 
to promote adequate risk management 
conventions for clearing activity. Carter and 
Garner (2015) also show the motivations of 
risk management in case of a default. 
The CCP121 also states that “SITG, not 
a significant loss-absorbing resource.” Their 
justification points out that neither CCPs 
nor international standards expect it to be the 
essential loss-absorbing tool of the guarantee 
system. However, they agree on the previously 
presented concept; namely, a too high value 
of the SITG “will weaken market participants’ 
incentives to participate in the default 
management process, as they will consider CCP 
skin-in-the-game and the potential for their 
own mutualisation when constructing bids in a 
default management auction” (CCP12, 2019).
Daly (2015) gave a reason that skin-
in-the-game contributions are significant 
because a potential solution for CCPs to 
stop a substantial default from happening 
is to have access to ample resources, and 
“clearinghouse contributions would be a perfect 
place to start.” Based on the different markets 
and guarantee funds reported in 2014, the 
separately managed guaranty funds dedicated 
to cleared interest rate and credit-default swaps 
contributed over $200 million, a maximum 
of 2.2% of the guaranty fund’s total assets. 
In Europe, under EMIR, the contribution is 
25% of their own capital resources, and they 
should have a minimum capital requirement 
higher than 7.5 million euros. The difference 
resembles between the European and the US 
clearinghouses’ financial situation. 
McPartland and Lewis (2017) get to the 
conclusion that no matter what the ownership 
structure of the CCP is, the „skin-in-the-
game should be pre-funded and on deposit with 
the appropriate central bank.” This gives relief 
for every participant in the system because, 
in this way, the financial commitment from 
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the CCP is in a pre-funded form, and it is 
available immediately under the most adverse 
of circumstances.
Researchers and regulators highlight the 
interconnectedness between CCPs, and from 
these perspectives, risks can be correlated 
across CCPs in several jurisdictions. Due 
to the possibility of building overlapping 
international memberships for CCPs, besides 
the spillover effects, one CCPs may face 
liquidity problems similar to others in the 
network they form. Domanski et al. (2015) 
consider a rare but extreme case if a participant 
bank would be unable to meet its obligations, 
being forced into resolution and even to fail, 
could threaten the resilience of the whole 
network, including several CCPs at the same 
time. Socially essential questions may arise 
because the default of a globally significant 
participant would promulgate a burden for 
surviving participants. 
ThE InADEQUACy oF ThE DEFAUlT 
wATErFAll: rEsolUTIon AnD 
rECovEry 
Regulators expect these financial market 
infrastructures to withstand extreme market 
conditions, but the shock event may be so 
immense that the CCP’s prefunded and callable 
resources are exhausted and still insufficient 
to cover the losses. This extreme situation 
would trigger tremendous uncertainty, 
altering the value of the underlying exposures, 
therefore heightening the associated market 
and counterparty risk for the whole system 
(Domanski et al., 2015). This is why regulators 
require CCPs to assure continuity in the 
provision of clearing services for systemic 
stability and of an orderly resolution by having 
prepared recovery and resolution plans on 
hand [CPSS-IOSCO (2012), CPMI-IOSCO 
(2014), FSB (2014)].
Recovery planning
The strategy and the default fund composition 
strongly defines the additional resources to 
be included in the default waterfall system, 
and the tools to be used in case resources 
are still insufficient. The final action a CCP 
implements to protect the financial systems 
are recovery and resolution regimes (Cont, 
2015). 
Peters and Wollny (2018) point out the 
importance of preparation. The recovery plan 
is a crucial tool for both CCPs and regulator 
to be prepared to identify the critical 
services; the stress scenarios in case of default 
and non-default events, that may stop the 
CCP from being able to provide its critical 
functions. Both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of criteria shall be identified to 
trigger the application of all or part of the 
recovery plan and the recovery tools. The 
plan should outline the possibilities the CCP 
has in various circumstances. The relevant 
supervising authority must periodically 
review the plan and assess its adequacy. In the 
case of significant change on the market or 
in the regulatory background, it can generate 
deficiencies leading to the consideration 
of implementing the plan. This requires 
a flexible implementation of the plan. 
However, the set of supervisory intervention 
is limited. The execution of the plan is solely 
the responsibility of the CCP. To facilitate 
the quantification of potential exposure to 
the CCP, regulators endeavor to enhance 
transparency by elaborating on the impact in 
the recovery plan for clearing members. 
The general framework of recovery tools 
provided by the regulator refers to tools to be 
used in case of a defaulting member and steps 
to allocate losses not caused by a participant 
default (CPMI-IOSCO, 2014). In the 
following, these tools are presented altogether 
with its characteristics.
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Tools for uncovered losses caused  
by participant default
Cash calls (Assessment powers). In a going 
concern, CCPs can require non-defaulting 
clearing members to provide additional 
financial, but only for covering losses due to 
default. These calls to clearing members should 
be proportionate to the pre-paid default 
resources or the market-to-market value of the 
positions the clearing members bring to the 
CCP on a given day. To enhance transparency 
while mitigating uncertainty of the callable 
cash amount, the European Parliament 
opts for the possibility of several cash calls, 
maximized by the resolution authority. 
The aim is to reduce the maximum loss that 
would fall on any individual non-defaulting 
clearing member by mutualizing the loss 
in proportion to the risk that the clearing 
member brings to the CCP. Even more, this 
approach would provide ex-ante incentives for 
clearing members to limit the risk they bring 
to the CCP (Peters and Wollny, 2018).
Variation margin haircutting by the CCP. 
This is a limited-time tool that involves 
reducing haircutting - in any variation 
margin gains/profits due to the non-
defaulting members. All claims, either gross 
or net or only marked to market gains, can be 
subject to haircutting. The most significant 
disadvantage is that over time, participants 
will be unwilling to provide the required 
initial margin. If the CCP cannot re-establish 
its clearing activity promptly, further steps 
should be taken.
Use of initial margin. As discussion over the 
initial margin usage in the previous sections 
stated, it is used to cover the obligations 
of the provider, and it cannot be used for 
loss-mutualization purposes. Generally, the 
initial margin is remote from the insolvency 
of the CCP, and it is not subject to a 
reduction in either recovery or insolvency. If 
the initial margin of the surviving members 
is used, they are required to replenish the 
initial margin and to decrease their exposure 
at the CCP to the level that their remaining 
initial margin provides adequate coverage or 
a combination of both. This recovery tool 
being implemented could further undermine 
confidence in the CCP. It would also generate 
procyclicality in the system. The willingness 
of the clearing members to meet the margin 
calls imposed by the CCP will plummet 
drastically. 
Many [EACH (2015), PFMI (2017)] 
draw precautions to the use of this tool! The 
primary pro argument for allowing the use 
of initial margins is the significant level of 
available resources that the CCP could use. 
On the contrary, exhausting it would lead to 
members having posted insufficient collateral, 
thereby set off for margin calls. ISDA (2013), 
LCH.Clearnet (2014), EACH (2015) explains 
how applying this could lead to substantial 
procyclical effects. This tool would put 
considerable pressure on the liquidity of the 
clearing members and even cause liquidity 
shortages and, ultimately, clearing member 
defaults (Pirrong, 2011). 
Other tools that involve collateral and 
capital. These tools are using the CCP’s own 
capital and, if necessary, raising additional 
capital. The purpose is to cover losses of a 
default. This tool can be part of the ordinary 
default waterfall, or it can appear among 
recovery or both.
Tools to address uncovered liquidity 
shortfalls
Obtain liquidity from participants or 
third-party insti tutions. A CCP can have 
arrangements in place with third-party 
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institutions. These tools are useful in case of 
less stressed market conditions. They are less 
reliable forms of liquidity, but if included in 
the recovery plan, additional tools should be 
used to manage liquidity shortfalls in highly 
stressed events as well.
Two option play here: Requiring 
participants who are owed funds by the 
CCP, to the extent of those obligations 
to provide a collateralized loan, a repo, or 
a swap transaction. The second option is 
applying ex-ante rules that permit the CCP 
to obtain liquidity more broadly from all 
participants. While the first option benefits 
from incentivizing participants to follow up 
on the CCP’s risk management, the second 
option could lead to performance risk.
Tools to replenish financial resources
Cash calls and Recapitalization is to be used. 
Tools for CCPs to re-establish  
a matched book following participant  
default
Forced allocation of contracts. The CCP 
would first try to reach out to voluntary 
and mandatory tools to achieve a matched 
book. A CCP can sell the positions to direct 
or indirect participants the outstanding 
obligations of the defaulter; it can also buy-
in any assets a defaulter has sold but failed 
to deliver, or the CCP can sell any assets a 
defaulter has bought but was unable to pay. 
During a forced allocation process, the CCP 
fully allocates unmatched positions of the 
defaulter’s contracts to participants that have 
not defaulted. They can also be compensated, 
as far as resources allow, for acquiring these 
contracts.
Contract termination: tear-up (complete, 
partial and voluntary). During complete 
tear-up, all positions - matched or unmatched 
positions – are terminated. There is a 
possibility to tear-up just some of the 
positions, or participants can be invited to 
nominate contracts to end them. By reducing 
some of the contracts, the CCP will reduce 
the exposure towards the concerned clearing 
members and, therefore, it can re-establish a 
matched book.
Tools to allocate losses not caused  
by participant default (NDL)
Capital and recapitalization. Raise addi-
tional equity capital.
Insurance or indemnity agreements. Insu-
rance or indemnity agreements may be an 
effective way of addressing the impact of 
specific business losses
Other tools. Cash calls, as discussed above. 
Most demanding and challenging is to define 
the tools that can be assessed to serve as a 
recovery tool. The challenge in choosing these 
tools is to fit the business model, the liability 
structure of the CCP, but it is vital to notice 
that some safety tools are already built into 
CCPs’ risk management. 
Regulators endeavor to establish the 
interaction between CCPs and the whole of 
the financial system as stable as possible. The 
steps taken are vital in every area, and the 
progress since the financial crisis of 2007–09 
is remarkable from the evolution of the central 
clearing activity point of view. However, 
the need for recovery and resolution tools 
must have objective and prudent regulation 
as well. 
The fail of a CCP would imply that 
procedures, risk management policies, and 
safeguard tools, were not prudent enough, or 
at least they have failed to fulfill their loss-
absorbing objective. 
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Resolution planning
Improving resilience is the most critical aspect. 
Incorporating liquidity and concentration risk 
factors in margin calculation methodologies 
and applying appropriate procyclical buffers are 
a primary tool. Increasing CCP contributions 
to the default waterfall to meaningful levels 
of SITG is particularly critical concerning 
for-profit institutions. Central counterparties 
must have effective default management 
processes.
Nonetheless, enhancing transparency 
by pub lishing valuable, standardized, and 
audited disclosures on CCP risk methodolo-
gies, backtesting, and stress testing. Non-
default loss event management is also essen-
tial; therefore, its manifestation should be 
supported by appropriately sized regulatory 
capital requirements. Besides the robust setup 
of the default waterfall, central counterparties 
also apply mechanisms, they set rigorous 
membership criteria, and systematic assess-
ment of members, collateral eligibility, and 
investment restrictions are also tools help in 
achieving resilience. 
The recovery plan is highly dependent on 
the design of the default waterfall the CCPs 
uses. A general approach of a recovery plan 
is to facilitate the process itself, and it is 
recommended to use the tools listed above. 
This list includes the pre-defined assessment 
rights, more capital of pre-funded CCP 
resources, variation margin gains haircutting, 
tear-up of contracts. 
Authorities intervene if the resolution plan 
fails to achieve the desired recovery level to 
assure continuity of the service providence. 
The resolution can reach out for tools like ex-
ante resources of CCPs that authorities require 
to set aside.
On 4 December 2019, the European 
Council adopted a position on recovery and 
resolution. The proposed framework keeps in 
mind the role of central counterparties and 
their systemic nature. Hence, the Council sets 
out a 3-step approach to provide coordination 
between national authorities in the framework 
of resolution colleges, including prevention 
and preparation (to identify obstacles to 
resolvability), timing and intervention (to 
prevent mass damages), resolution tools (to 
avoid public support).
Plata (2017) analyzes the protection the 
recovery and resolution plans provide for 
CCPs, and he suggests four principles that an 
active CCP recovery and resolution regime 
should take into account: the extremeness of 
a potentially adverse event, the importance 
of restoring a matched book, incentives and 
keeping the balance between certainty and 
flexibility. 
ConClUsIons
The development of CCPs is driven by 
aiming to assure the resilience and robustness 
of the financial system. Regulators and 
market participants work together to build 
the most balanced regulatory framework 
that strengthens the system while allows 
significant competition on the market. The 
strategy of the CCP regarding the design of 
the default waterfall can affect the alignment 
of the incentives both on the CCP’s 
management and its clearing members. As 
shown in this paper, incentives created by 
CCPs – with the inclusion of SITG in the 
default waterfall - must align the strategy 
and the risk appetite. 
For the mechanism to be entirely 
predictable and transparent, in my opinion, 
a CCP should be prepared with the amount 
of SITG included in the default waterfall that 
does not create an inverse incentive for clearing 
members which would decline to onboard 
the defaulted clearing members, avoiding to 
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exacerbate the stress on the market. Tight 
cooperation between the members and the 
CCP can also increase public confidence in 
the centralized clearing, which can assure 
the robustness of the financial system. The 
European capital market has never experienced 
a total annihilation. They were not even 
close to a near-fail scenario. Throughout the 
years, lines of defense were created to prevent 
adverse events, but real circumstances did not 
test their effectiveness so far.  The mechanism 
has a strict framework, and the tools available 
should be used in line with the intensity of 
the upcoming situations. Only adverse events 
sharpen by the market will prove or contradict 
CCPs’ and the regulations’ efficacy.
Note
1 CCP12 is a global association of 37 members who operate more than 50 individual CCPs globally across 
EMEA, the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region.
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